

The Role of the Gricean Maxims in the Generation of Referring Expressions

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Abstract

Grice’s maxims of conversation [Grice 1975] are framed as directives to be followed by a speaker of the language. This paper argues that, when considered from the point of view of natural language generation, such a characterisation is rather misleading, and that the desired behaviour falls out quite naturally if we view language generation as a goal-oriented process. We argue this position with particular regard to the generation of referring expressions.

Introduction

The position taken in this paper can be summarised as follows.

1. Grice’s maxims [Grice 1975] are framed as directives to the speaker, and so it is natural to consider how they might impact on the task of natural language generation (NLG).
2. A number of the maxims can collectively be expressed by the imperative “Don’t say too much and don’t say too little.” This focusses our attention on the language generation subtask of CONTENT DETERMINATION; and one of the more constrained and well-explored aspects of content determination is the generation of referring expressions. However, if we look at this task in detail, it becomes clear that there are problems with enforcing a literal interpretation of the maxims.
3. We review some of our previous work that has tried to address this problem, but go on to suggest a rather more radical position: that Grice’s maxims are unnecessary directives from the point of view of referring expression generation, and that, provided the register and sublanguage conventions of the genre in force are conformed to, the behaviour the maxims characterise actually falls out quite naturally from viewing NLG as a goal-oriented process.

Under this view, the maxims are no more than *post hoc* characterisations of the way language works, and their framing as directives is ultimately rather misleading.

Adequate and Efficient Referring Expressions

Grice and Reference: Deciding What To Say

It has become commonplace to view language generation as encompassing two kinds of concerns: deciding what to say, and deciding how to say it.¹ The considerations that arise in deciding what to say are often expressed in terms that echo Grice’s Maxims of Quantity: don’t say too much, and don’t say too little. There are many reasons why such imperatives are worth attending to in the development of algorithms to be used by computational systems which generate natural language; for example, we want to make sure that we have given the hearer the information that she needs, but we don’t want to bore her with a flood of unnecessary statements. From the point of view of implicatures, however, an additional concern is that saying too much might lead the hearer to read between the lines in ways that were unintended by the underlying system. Ultimately, language generation systems should be as capable of *exploiting* the notion of conversational implicature as much as people do; but before we can achieve goals of that kind, it’s important that we know when we are *obeying* the maxims. In other words, our first priority is to ensure that the generated text does not unintentionally contain false implicatures.

The task of generating referring expressions—and in particular, anaphoric referring expressions—provides an arena where we can move towards a more formal specification of what this really involves. Given some

¹We take no particular stance in the present discussion as to how this distinction impacts on the modularity of the architecture of a language generation system.

internal symbol that corresponds to an intended referent, the job of a referring expression generator is to determine the semantic content of a noun phrase that will identify the intended referent to the hearer. The first serious consideration of this issue in the NLG literature was probably McDonald’s [1980] discussion of Potential Distractors—other entities in the context we might mistakenly refer to—when deciding whether or not it was safe to use a pronoun to refer to an entity. Appelt [1982] and Novak [1988] looked at determining the content of definite noun phrase referring expressions in situations where (for whatever reason) a pronoun could not be used. In Dale [1989], one of us characterised the task of determining the content of a referring expression as being constrained by three Grice-like principles: the PRINCIPLE OF SENSITIVITY, which states that the referring expression chosen should take account of the state of the hearer’s knowledge; the PRINCIPLE OF ADEQUACY, which states that the referring expression chosen should be sufficient to identify the intended referent; and the PRINCIPLE OF EFFICIENCY, which states that the referring expression chosen should provide no more information than is necessary for the identification of the intended referent.

An Algorithm for Saying The Right Amount

Suggestions that referring expression generation should be governed by principles like those just described are common, but detailed algorithms that meet the specified goals are somewhat rarer. Dale [1989] proposed an algorithm which assumes the following scenario:

Suppose that we have a set of entities C (called the CONTEXT SET) such that $C = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n\}$; and our task is to distinguish from this context set some intended referent r where $r \in C$. Suppose, also, that each entity a_k is described in the system’s knowledge base by means of a set of properties, $p_{k_1}, p_{k_2}, \dots, p_{k_m}$. In order to distinguish our intended referent r from the other entities in C , we need to find some set of properties which are together true of r , but of no other entity in C . The linguistic realisation of this set of properties constitutes a DISTINGUISHING DESCRIPTION (DD) of r with respect to the context C . A MINIMAL DISTINGUISHING DESCRIPTION is then the linguistic realisation of the smallest such set of properties.

The detail of the algorithm is unimportant for present purposes; basically, it consists of three steps as follows:

1. Check Success: see if the description we have constructed so far picks out only one entity in the context. If it does, stop. If not, go to Step 2.

2. Choose Property: determine which property of the intended referent would rule out the largest number of other entities in the context. Go to Step 3.
3. Extend Description: add the chosen property to the description being constructed, and remove the entities it rules out from the context. Go to Step 1 with this extended description and the reduced context.

Reiter [1990] noted a serious deficiency of this algorithm: it will not in fact always produce a minimal distinguishing description, and indeed finding a minimal distinguishing description is equivalent to solving a minimal set-cover problem, which is NP-hard. The computational complexity of this task raises the question of whether it is appropriate to insist on an algorithm that creates minimal distinguishing descriptions. In other words, it may be unreasonable to try to construct maximally adequate and efficient referring expressions; or, more to the point, meeting Grice’s requirements of saying neither too much nor too little, if taken literally, may be computationally unachievable.

Cooperative Behaviour as an Epiphenomenon

Allowing in Redundancy

One response to Reiter’s objection is to take the view that the notion of minimality sought in the algorithm above is too strong. In subsequent work we took a step back and asked: what do *people* actually do when they construct referring expressions? It is very difficult to make any strong claims on the basis of the experiments that have been done, but it does seem to be the case that people do not build minimal distinguishing descriptions in the strong sense suggested above. We explored these considerations in more detail in [Dale and Reiter 1995], where we proposed a revised algorithm which is computationally efficient at the cost of producing some informational redundancy in the referring expressions it generates.

Implicit vs Explicit Pursuance of the Maxims

So: obeying the Gricean maxims looks computationally problematic, and it seems not to be what people do (with some caveats: we are assuming a literal interpretation of the maxims, and assuming that it is possible to generalise from the experimental results).

Our early attempts to generate referring expressions (as presented, for example, in Dale [1989] and Reiter [1990]) explicitly enforced variants of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity. However, our current hypothesis is that this is in fact unnecessary. We now take the view that it is a mistake to view the Gricean Maxims

as directives; they are really no more than *post hoc* characterisations of what is going on. They may even mislead us in the construction of mechanisms that cooperate conversationally.

It is generally accepted that language generation can fruitfully be viewed as a goal-oriented process. In other words, a natural language generation system may be given as input an agenda of goals that are to be satisfied in the text being constructed; the system's task is to find linguistic devices that satisfy each goal, removing the goal from the agenda once it has been achieved. There are a wide variety of goals that might appear in such a mechanism. In the context of referring expression generation, typical goals could include:

- Getting the hearer to identify the intended referent r .
- Alerting the hearer to the fact that r has the property represented by the attribute value pair $\langle a, v \rangle$.

A goal of the form of the first of these will give rise to the construction of a distinguishing description; a goal of the form of the second of these might result in the inclusion of information beyond that required for referent identification (Robin [1994] is a good discussion of some of the issues that arise in developing algorithms to achieve such goals). This information could be expressed in a separate clause, but could equally well be folded into the same referring expression that is being used for the referent identification in the first goal (Appelt [1982] provides a very nice example of this).

The fact that information can appear in a noun phrase for purposes other than referent identification means, of course, that the hearer has to do some work in determining what the role of each provided descriptor is. In the case of an utterance like *Give me the red pen*, the speaker may be providing the term *red* in order to distinguish the intended referent from another pen which is green. It is equally possible, though, that there is only one pen in the context, and *red* is included in the description because colour has special salience (it may be easier for the speaker to first look for red objects, and then find the particular red object which is a pen). Another possibility—perhaps a little tenuous in the current example, but clearly a possibility nonetheless—is that the hearer may be red-green colour blind, and the speaker is imparting additional information about the colour of the pen which the hearer may be able to make use of later. A more common clue to descriptor purpose is that fact that some properties are more likely to be used for referent identification than others. In the utterance *Sit by the newly-painted table*, for example, the property *newly-painted* could be being used to distinguish the

intended referent from other tables in the context, but it is rather more likely that its purpose is to warn the hearer not to put her elbows on the table.²

In addition to goal orientation, aspects of genre such as register and sublanguage also play an important role in determining appropriate referring expressions. In particular, whether a specific referring expression is interpreted by the hearer as being purely for identification or not may depend on the current genre. For example, in casual conversation, a hearer might interpret *Give me the Staedtler pen* as having some purpose beyond simple identification (perhaps informing the hearer that the speaker prefers pens made by Staedtler), since manufacturer is not a commonly used attribute in identification-only referring expressions in this genre. In an inventory-stocking context, on the other hand, *Give me the Staedtler pens* might be construed as purely referential, since manufacturer is often used as an identifying attribute in this genre. Consequently, an NLG system that is generating an identification-only referring expression should if possible use only those attributes that are typically used for identification in the target genre; otherwise, false implicatures may arise. However, again we believe that there is no need to explicitly model this phenomenon as an implicature; it is sufficient to design the system so that it uses the identifying attributes preferred in its target genre (as is done via the PREFERREDATTRIBUTES list in the algorithm of [Dale and Reiter 1995]).

Although in the above examples the hearer may have to perform some potentially complex inferencing to determine what the speakers' goals are, note that there is no need for the speaker to do anything other than satisfy the list of goals using resources appropriate to the current genre. Nowhere is there an explicit attempt to adhere to the maxims.

Reassessing the Maxims

In the light of the above discussion, we revisit Grice's maxims in this section and comment on how each might be best interpreted in the context of natural language generation.

The Maxim of Quality

Try to make your contribution one that is true. More specifically:

1. *Do not say what you believe to be false.*
2. *Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.*

²This example is due to Bonnie Webber.

No natural language generation systems that we are aware of deliberately say things that are false: this can happen by accident, of course, but then it is not intentional.

An arguable exception to this claim is the work of Jameson [1987], whose Imp system injects bias into its utterances in order to mislead; but even here this is not done by telling lies. Certainly, in principle one could construct a generation system that ‘lied’ for purposes such as advertising or manipulation, or that produced descriptions that were ‘correct’ relative to the hearer’s knowledge even if they were untrue in the world; for example, we might want to build a system which could generate *the man drinking a martini* to refer to a man who was actually drinking water from a martini glass. This would require explicit programming, however; the default behaviour of all systems we are aware of is to automatically obey the Maxim of Quality.

The Maxim of Quantity

1. *Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).*
2. *Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.*

The first part of the Maxim of Quantity is automatically fulfilled by a goal-oriented system: the goal will not be satisfied until sufficient information is provided. What we should say about the second part of the maxim, however, depends on how strongly or literally we choose to interpret it. If we insist that referring expressions or other utterances contain no unnecessary words, then we will probably have to explicitly enforce this as a constraint in our NLG system; in general, NLG systems will not automatically obey this rule. On the other hand, if we interpret the second part of the Maxim of Quantity as meaning ‘do not go out of your way to add extra information that is not needed’, then this behaviour once more comes for free with goal-orientation. Our experience suggests that, at least for the task of generating referring expressions, the second interpretation is the best one.

The Maxim of Relevance

Be relevant.

Yet again, this follows directly from goal-oriented behaviour: there is no reason why the system should consider saying something that is not relevant. It is possible, of course, that an algorithm might unintentionally include irrelevant information; this is also true of human linguistic behaviour.

The Maxim of Manner

Be perspicuous. More specifically:

1. *Avoid obscurity of expression.*

2. *Avoid ambiguity.*

3. *Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).*

4. *Be orderly.*

These are places where an anticipation feedback mechanism of the kind proposed by Jameson and Wahlster [1982] might be appropriate: i.e. we might like a system to subject its proposed utterance to a self-monitoring stage, to make sure that it is not ambiguous and so on. Of all the maxims, it is perhaps these (with the exception of the brevity submaxim, to which our response is the same as our response to the Maxim of Quantity) which are most amenable to explicit modelling in the generation process; but even here it is equally possible that over time we learn heuristics that do the job for us, so that the generation task more or less naturally produces results that have the required characteristics (see Levelt’s [1989] comments on this as a possible characteristic of the human language production mechanism).

Exploiting Violations

The goal-oriented approach has the additional benefit that using violations of the maxims in order to get some other point across falls out as part of the same mechanism; again, see Jameson’s [1987] work in this regard. From the point of view of the generator they are not violations at all.

Conclusions

We have argued that Grice’s Maxims do not need to be explicitly enforced or modelled in a natural language generation system. Instead, they should be replaced by the following system construction principles.

Grice and Generation

A generation system should be goal-driven, and conform to the current genre. As a general architecture, this suggests a process which builds an agenda of goals, and then searches for communicative and linguistics resources in the target genre which can be used to realize these goals. There is the possibility that such a system may end up saying something beyond what was intended. That is acceptable. Minimality is not necessary; provided the information that is provided is there because it serves some purpose, hearers will not make inappropriate inferences.

Grice and Interpretation

As a corollary to the goal-oriented view of generation, the hearer should assume that every informational element in the speaker’s utterance is there with some intended purpose. The hearer’s job is then to work

out what the speaker's intended purpose is. If we are in a context, for example, where referent identification is obviously the task, and the expression contains information unnecessary for identification, the hearer must consider the possibility that this information has been provided by the speaker for some other purpose—but note that it might not be; it might have been put in to help with identification even if it turns out that the hearer did not make use of it for that purpose.³ Properties which are clearly not able to help us in identifying the intended referent must be doing something else. In the context of our *newly-painted table* example, it many cases it will be impossible to determine that something is newly-painted simply by looking; and it is unlikely that the speaker intends us to go around actually touching all the tables to identify which one has that property; so it is reasonable to assume that the property has been provided for some other purpose.

In Summary

Ultimately, for the generator, Grice's maxims taken collectively mean *Don't include elements that don't do anything*. Our position is that, under a goal-oriented view of language generation, there is no need to explicitly follow such a directive at all; the desired behaviour just falls out of the mechanism. We have argued, in the present paper, that this is true of the referring expression generation task; it remains to be seen whether the same story can be told of all language generation, and what the impact of this is on models of language understanding.

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³Returning to our earlier *red pen* example, suppose the hearer just happens to be focussed on the red pen when the utterance is produced. Then, the property of redness may have been included by the speaker in order to help the hearer identify the intended referent even if it is not used for this purpose.

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